Venice and the Political Economy of Overtourism: From Cost Compensation to Fiscal Dependence on the Tourist City

This article is published in:
Planum. The Journal of Urbanism no. 53, vol. II/2026

Author
Francesco Bandarin

Language
English

Format
Online

ISSN
1723-0993

Venice represents one of the most advanced cases of institutional adaptation to overtourism. The growth of the temporary population and accommodation capacity has been accompanied over time by the development of instruments through which the local public system obtains resources from visitors: from mobility charges to the tourist tax and, most recently, the access fee. This paper interprets this evolution as a shift from cost compensation to the fiscalisation of overtourism and, potentially, to dependence on it. When revenues generated by the temporary population contribute to the ordinary financing of the city, a reduction in visitor flows is no longer fiscally neutral. Drawing on budget data, tourism and demographic statistics, and administrative documents, the analysis reconstructs this process and proposes an indicator of municipal fiscal dependence on tourism. The Venetian case thus reveals a possible paradox: a city may become more efficient at governing and monetising overtourism without becoming less dependent on it. The paper therefore argues that a stable share of tourism-derived revenue should be directed towards strengthening the resident city, transforming tourism taxation from a primarily compensatory instrument into a lever for reducing dependence on the temporary population over time.

 
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